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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

3 December 1952

SUBJECT: NIE-64 (Part I) SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES,  
THROUGH MID-1954 <sup>1/</sup> (For consideration by the Board)

THE PROBLEM

To revise NIE-64 (Part I) in order to extend the estimate on  
Soviet Bloc<sup>2/</sup> capabilities for political and military warfare through mid-1954.

DISCUSSION

The following changes have been made in NIE-64 (Part I) in order to  
extend this estimate through mid-1954:

1. Under "Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities" two new paragraphs  
have been added to the scientific section; paragraphs 16, 17, and 19 in  
the original text have been substantially changed, and they now include  
corrections made necessary by subsequent research on the Bloc economy.

- <sup>1/</sup> Changes in the original text of NIE-64 (Part I) are indicated by the  
underlined text of this Supplement. Deletions have been bracketed.
- <sup>2/</sup> The Soviet Bloc consists on the USSR, the European Satellites, Com-  
munist China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and Viet Minh. The Kremlin  
also controls the international Communist movement outside the Bloc  
countries.

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2. Under "Bloc Military Strength" paragraphs 24, 25, 26, and 28 have undergone various degrees of revision.

3. Under "Bloc Military Capabilities" revisions have been made in paragraphs 32 and 36.

4. Under "Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities" three new paragraphs have been added.

#### THE PROPOSED CHANGES

##### "Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities"

1. (Insert after paragraph 15 in original text) Since World War II, the USSR has given high priority to modern electronic and communication systems and has acquired a competence in these fields which can be favorably compared with that of the US or of the UK. At the present time, the USSR is augmenting its extensive early warning network with modern GCI radar equipment in performance to US operational equipment; has operational quantities of shipboard and antiaircraft fire control equipment utilizing radar; has, in limited operational use, blind bombing radar equipment; has, at least in the experimental stage, a long-range hyperbolic navigation system; and could produce limited operational quantities of proximity fused antiaircraft ammunition by 1953. The USSR has developed a very high capability for jamming radio transmissions up to and including HF bands. Soviet capabilities in related electronic fields indicate that they are now capable of developing equipment for jamming VHF and UHF bands. These capabilities constitute an increasingly serious threat to Western long-range [ and short-range

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military <sup>1/</sup> radio communication and navigation systems and will by mid-1954  
include the ability to interfere with short-range systems.

2. (Insert after the above paragraph) We estimate that by mid-1954  
the USSR will have in operational use a long-range hyperbolic navigation  
system and limited operational quantities of some type of airborne intercept  
equipment. The USSR may also have both passive and active electronic counter-  
measures equipment for use against most currently operational types of  
Western radars and, in addition, will have some type of radar camouflage  
material. Soviet conversion to VHF equipment in aircraft units is underway  
and might be operationally completed by mid-1954; by that time, a substan-  
tial proportion of the Soviet air defense communications network could be  
converted to a UHF system, provided this latter project were given sufficient  
priority.

3. (Revised paragraph 16) The gross national product of the Bloc has  
been increasing rapidly in the past few years. Any calculation of its magni-  
tude is necessarily subject to considerable error, and no meaningful compari-  
son can be made with prewar years for the Bloc as a whole. However, we estimate  
that the Bloc's national product in 1951 was roughly [15] 20 percent  
higher than in 1949, and that rapid growth will continue during the period  
of this estimate.

a. The economy of the USSR had recovered its prewar level of  
total production by 1948 and had surpassed that level by [an estimated  
20-30] at least one-third in 1951. We estimate that the Soviet national

<sup>1/</sup> With the exception of the underlined section, the last three sentences  
of this paragraph were taken from NIE-64 (Part I), Appendices, "Appendix  
A, paragraph 24-c-3."

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product [is] has been increasing at an annual rate of [6-7] about 11 percent, and that it will continue to increase at approximately this rate during the period of this estimate.

b. The combined production of the Satellites constitutes approximately one-quarter of the Bloc's national product. We believe that the Satellite national product has increased [since 1949, but we are unable to estimate the amount of the increase.] and will increase at a rate approximating that of the USSR during the period of this estimate.

c. The national product of Communist China is extremely difficult to estimate, but we believe that it represents less than 15 percent of the Bloc total. Communist China's national product is probably increasing at an annual rate of 3 to 5 percent, but its output of capital goods will continue to be a very small part of the Bloc total.

4. (Revised paragraph 17) The output of the Soviet economy does not approach that of the US economy, nor does the output of the Bloc economy as a whole compare with that of the NATO states. USSR gross national product in 1951 was about one-quarter that of the US, and the combined gross national product of the entire Bloc was about 30 percent that of the NATO countries. However, these disparities are being gradually reduced.

5. (Revised paragraph 19) Since the end of World War II, the Bloc as a whole has devoted a much larger proportion of its gross national product to military purposes than the West. We believe that the USSR now devotes about one-fifth of its national product to military expenditures. We estimate that the quantity of resources which the USSR will devote to

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military production in 1952 will equal the amount assigned in 1944, and that a greater amount will be allocated to military production in 1954.

"Bloc Military Strength"

6. (Revised paragraph 24) We estimate that the Bloc armed forces by mid-1954 will probably have:

a. Approximately 9,400,000 men, of which about 4,520,000 will be Soviet; 2,000,000 Satellite; 2,450,000 Chinese Communist; 300,000 North Korean; and 130,000 Viet Minh.

b. An authorized strength of about 26,700 aircraft, including about 13,000 jet fighters, 1,250 piston medium bombers, and possibly a few jet medium bombers. (Repeat footnote 3 on page 4 of original text.)

c. A total of approximately 260 major surface vessels and 471 submarines, including 153 long-range types.

d. A stockpile of 190 atomic weapons (30-100 kiloton yield).  
(The actual figure may be from half to twice as many as this estimate.)

7. (Revised paragraph 25) It is unlikely that the USSR will be able to develop and produce a thermonuclear weapon by mid-1953. However, we believe that the USSR will continue to make progress toward a thermonuclear weapon and that field testing concerned with thermonuclear reactions may take place by mid-1954.

8. (Revised paragraph 26) The over-all effectiveness of Bloc ground, naval, and air forces will increase by [mid-1953] mid-1954 because of progressive modernization and standardization of weapons and equipment, the intensive training program, the growth of <sup>the</sup> Soviet atomic stockpile, and the increased combat efficiency of the Satellite armies.

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9. (Revised paragraph 28) The USSR maintains a large air defense system which not only includes the forces assigned to the Soviet air defense organization (PVO-Strany) but also has available to it the active air defense resources of the Army, tactical air forces, and Navy not otherwise committed, as well as the passive defense resources of the police and civilian organizations. The European Satellite and Communist Chinese air defenses add to and are integrated with the Soviet system. Despite significant improvements in the air defense system, there will probably continue to be insufficient numbers of trained and experienced pilots and operators, modern radar, heavy AA guns, and fighters designed specifically for all-weather interception to provide defense for all important areas. We estimate that by [mid-1953] mid-1954 the numerical strength of the air defense forces will not [change] increase substantially, although the effectiveness of the air defenses will improve through re-equipment and training.

#### "Bloc Military Capabilities"

10. (Revised paragraph 32) The Bloc air defense organization has the capability for vigorous opposition to an air offensive against the principal Soviet centers. However, despite marked improvements in the Bloc air defense system (especially in the USSR, Eastern [Germany, Poland] Europe, and Manchuria), deficiencies will remain throughout the period of this estimate.

11. (Revised paragraph 36) Since the beginning of the Korean war, the Communist Air Force in China, which is believed to be made up of Chinese Communist, North Korean, and Soviet elements, has been built to

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an impressive size. The jet fighter units in the Korea-Manchuria-North China area are believed to be progressively improving. During the period through mid-1953 [However,] the capabilities of the CAF in China [are] will remain largely limited to the air defense of North China, Manchuria, and North Korea under conditions of good visibility and to limited attacks against UN forces in Korea and adjacent waters. However, we estimate that the capabilities of this air force to extend its offensive operations beyond the present limited theater of operations will increase by mid-1954 as a result of the introduction of jet light bombers.<sup>1/</sup> We believe that the CAF in China will continue to expand gradually during the period of this estimate but will remain entirely dependent upon the USSR for aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and technical supervision, and almost entirely dependent upon the USSR for aviation fuel and lubricants. [Unless some type of jet light bombardment aircraft is introduced, the offensive capabilities of this air force will remain extremely limited. Redeployment from the Manchuria area would be necessary for sustained air operations against Taiwan and Southeast Asia.]

#### "Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities"

12. Bloc political warfare capabilities will continue to constitute a serious danger to the non-Communist world during the period of this estimate. We believe that during this period Bloc political warfare capabilities are likely to increase in such areas of known instability as the Middle East and Southeast Asia. These areas are particularly vulnerable to

<sup>1/</sup> We have requested A-2 to provide an expansion of this new offensive capability.

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further Communist exploitation because of economic and social unrest, the decline in Western strength and influence since the end of World War II, and the ineffective leadership of the non-Communist governments. Moreover, in these areas the widespread sentiment against "Western imperialism" and the desire for "national independence" and improved economic status provide further opportunities for Communist exploitation.

13. In the Middle East, Iran will remain the principal center of instability during the period of this estimate. However, we believe that the Bloc agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party, will not be able to gain control of the government by infiltration or to develop the strength to overthrow the National Front by constitutional means or by force through 1953. Unexpected events, such as a serious crop failure or a split in the National Front as a result of rivalry among its leaders, would increase Tudeh capabilities greatly. If present trends in Iran continue unchecked beyond the end of 1953, rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of governmental authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh.

during the period of this estimate  
14. We believe that Bloc political warfare capabilities in Southeast Asia will be largely determined by developments in Indochina, during the period of this estimate, particularly the degree of military pressure the Viet Minh forces, with Communist Chinese advice and military assistance, bring to bear on the French and the Associated States. While the odds



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now are against a decisive shift in the political and military balance of  
forces, these odds may shift rapidly, particularly if the military capa-  
bilities of the non-Communist forces were substantially weakened. A  
Communist victory in Indochina would probably result in Communist control,  
by force or accommodation, of most or all of the Southeast Asian mainland  
countries, although not necessarily within the period of this estimate.

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